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Abstract 
In this paper, we exploit pension reform-induced changes in retirement eligibility requirements to 
assess the role of grandparental child care availability in the labor force participation of women 
with children under 15. We focus on Italy for two reasons: first, it has low rates of female 
employment and little formal child care provision, and second, it has undergone several pension 
reforms in a relatively short time span. Our analysis shows that, among the women studied, those 
whose own mothers are retirement eligible have a 11 percent higher probability of being in the 
labor force than those whose mothers are ineligible. The pension eligibility of maternal 
grandfathers and paternal grandparents, however, has no significant effect on the women’s labor 
force participation. We also demonstrate that the eligibility of maternal grandmothers mainly 
captures the effect of their availability for child care. Hence, pension reforms, by potentially 
robbing households of an important source of flexible, low-cost child care, could have unintended 
negative consequences for the employment rates of women with children. 
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I. Introduction 
Given the progressive population aging in developed countries, increasing female labor force 
participation (hereafter, LFP) and employment are paramount if Europe is to meet its 2020 target of 
75 percent employment among those aged 20–64, a necessary objective for boosting economic 
growth and ensuring national pension system sustainability. Achieving this goal involves narrowing 
the employment gender gap, which to different degrees is still substantial in all EU member states 
but especially high in Southern European countries. In fact, a recent OECD (2012) analysis of labor 
market gender gaps reports 2011 male versus female employment rates in the 15–64 age group of 
65.9 versus 45.1 percent in Greece, 64.1 versus 52.8 percent in Spain, and 67.5 versus 46.5 percent 
in Italy. 
Although several explanations are proposed for the low labor force attachment of women in 
Southern European countries, the most cited are cultural influences like the “male breadwinner 
model” and institutional constraints. Among the latter, the lack of publicly provided child care is 
stressed as a major barrier to women’s reconciliation of family with career (Del Boca and Sauer 
2009). In Italy, for instance, public expenditure on child care accounts for a tiny 0.2 percent of 
GDP, which is half of the average OECD–30 expenditure (see Figure 1). Unfortunately, the need to 
cope with tight budgetary constraints after the Great Recession has prevented most Southern 
European countries from increasing the funds allocated to family policies and thus hampered any 
substantial progress in raising female employment. It is therefore likely that in a context of low or 
even shrinking public child care provision, grandparents (and relatives in general) may serve as an 
important source of affordable child care for working women. According to Hank and Buber 
(2009), for instance, about 32 percent of European grandmothers are engaged in regular child care 
(i.e., almost weekly or more often) with percentages in countries such as Greece, Italy, and Spain 
almost twice as large as those in Scandinavia. 
In this paper, we assess whether grandparents’ potential availability for child care, proxied by 
their meeting pension eligibility requirements, has a positive effect on female, and especially 
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maternal, labor force participation.1 This question is relevant not only in light of the widespread 
structural underinvestment in public child care in many European countries, but also the recent 
pension reforms introduced in many EU member states. These reforms, by setting stricter retirement 
eligibility requirements such as a higher retirement age, may have unintended consequences on 
female employment. For example, we show that a raised retirement age, by reducing the supply of 
low cost, flexible, informal child care provided by grandparents, can reduce the labor force 
participation of mothers. Hence, pension reforms that are not coupled with sufficient investment in 
public child care may further exacerbate the already wide intergenerational and gender gaps in 
employment by reducing the employment of young women relative not only to older women but 
also to young men, who traditionally bear less of the child care burden.  
The case of Italy is ideal for studying how changes in pension eligibility impact employment 
rates because in recent years it has undergone several pension reforms that have gradually increased 
retirement requirements. For instance, whereas prior to 1992, the 20-year accumulated contribution 
rule allowed many public sector workers to retire in their 40s or early 50s, since then several 
pension reforms have gradually raised the age requirement to 65. These pension eligibility rules, 
which vary over time and according to such factors as gender and employment sector, provide an 
arguably exogenous variation (see also, Bottazzi et al. 2006, Battistin et al. 2009, 2015, Aparicio-
Fenoll and Vidal-Fernandez 2015) used in this paper to identify the effect of grandparental child 
care availability on maternal employment.  
Our estimates show that mothers of cohabiting children under 15 whose own mothers are 
eligible for retirement have a 7.1 percentage point higher probability of labor force participation 
(+11 percent) than those whose mothers are not yet eligible. We interpret this result to mean that 
grandparental availability for child care facilitates the labor force participation of women with 
1 In this paper, we use the term “women” to refer to the females whose labor force status is being investigated. Although 
both parents and parents-in-law are sometimes collectively referred to as “grandparents,” (adopting the perspective of 
the women’s children) the women’s “mother” and “father” are specifically designated as “maternal grandmother” and 
“maternal grandfather,” respectively, while the “mother-in-law” and “father-in-law” are labeled “paternal grandmother” 
and “paternal grandfather.”  
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young children. This interpretation is confirmed by the absence of any such effect for men or for 
women with no cohabiting children under 15, but a large effect for women with very young 
children, who have the most intensive child care needs, and for low-educated mothers or  mothers in 
small municipalities, who have fewer child care alternatives available in the market. Our baseline 
results are also robust to several sensitivity checks; in particular, accounting for potential sample 
selection issues into having a cohabiting child aged 0–14, considering employment instead of LFP, 
and including controls for additional pathways through which grandparental retirement eligibility 
may affect female LFP (e.g., income and wealth transfers). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II first outlines a simple 
conceptual framework for understanding the effect of grandparental availability for child care on 
female LFP, then briefly reviews the most relevant empirical literature and highlights our main 
contributions. Section III gives a brief history of the Italian pension laws, whose nature assures 
exogenous variation in grandparental availability for child care, and describes our empirical 
strategy. Section IV describes the data used in our empirical analysis, and Section V investigates the 
relation between pension eligibility and retirement status. Section VI reports our primary analytical 
results and the outcomes of several robustness checks, after which Section VII reports some back-
of-the-envelope calculations of the potential effect of pension laws on maternal aggregate 
employment. Section VIII summarizes the main findings and concludes the paper. 
 
II. A Simple Conceptual Framework and Related Literature 
Although the extant studies on grandparental child care’s effect on women’s labor market 
outcomes differ greatly in both measurement variables and identification strategies, the main 
identification issues and related potential weaknesses can be summarized using a very simple 
conceptual framework borrowed from Connelly (1992). We first assume that a woman with young 
children must decide whether or not to participate in the formal labor market. We define her utility 
function as ܷ = (ܺ௠, ܳ, ݐ௅), where ܺ௠ is goods consumption, ܳ is child quality, and ݐ௅ is leisure 
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time. The woman maximizes her utility subject to the budget, mother’s time and child’s time 
constraints, yielding the following maximization problem: 
 
maxܷ = ܷ(ܺ௠, ܳ, ݐ௅) 
subject to 
– a child-quality production function: ܳ = ܳ(ݐொ, ݐ௖௖ݍ), where ݐொ and ݐ௖௖ are time devoted to child 
care by the mother and child care time bought in the market, respectively, while ݍ is the average 
quality of the external (formal or informal) child care available to the mother, which we assume 
to be exogenous.2 The quality of maternal child care is normalized to one, and we assume that 
ܳଵ, ܳଶ > 0 and ܳଵଵ, ܳଶଶ < 0; 
– the budget constraint: ݐ௠ܹ + ܸ = ܺ௠ + ௖ܲ௖ݐ௖௖, where ݐ௠ is the time the mother works in the 
market, ܹ is her wage, ܸ is her nonlabor income, and ௖ܲ௖ is the price of external child care; 
– the mother’s time constraint: ݐ௠ + ݐொ + ݐ௅ = 1; 
– the child’s time constraint: ݐொ + ݐ௖௖ = 1; 
where both mother and child time endowments are normalized to one. 
Using these constraints, we are able to reduce the number of choice variables to two:  maternal child 
care time and leisure time, whose respective first order conditions are 
ܹ − ௖ܲ௖ = ௎ೂ௎೉ (ܳଵ − ܳଶݍ)     (1)  
ܹ = ௎ಽ௎೉ .      (2)  
Equation (1) indicates that at optimum, the mother’s cost for devoting one additional hour to child 
care (i.e., the difference between her market wage and the price of external child care) must be 
                                                            
2 Here, for the sake of simplicity, we deviate from Connelly (1992) who models ݍ as a choice variable for women. 
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equal to the net benefit in terms of the child care quality provided, which depends in turn on the 
productivity differential between maternal and external child care (i.e., on the latter’s quality). This 
equation makes clear that the availability of grandparent-provided child care has a twofold effect on 
maternal choices. First, it decreases the price of external child care, increasing the cost of one 
additional hour spent with the child (i.e., the net wage). Second, if the mother considers 
grandparent-provided child care to be of greater quality than formal external child care, an increase 
in ݍ also contributes to reducing the benefits of maternal child care. For both these reasons, a 
woman may lower her amount of child care and increase her labor force participation and/or labor 
supply in response to grandparental availability for child care. 
This simple framework allows us to discuss the main identification issue while also pointing 
out certain weaknesses in the extant literature. One major identification problem is that a simple 
OLS regression of maternal labor supply on grandparent-provided child care may lead to biased 
estimates because this latter is unlikely to be exogenous with respect to the former. At the same 
time, both the reverse causality of grandparents providing child care because a woman works and 
the simultaneous existence of unobservable (or unobserved) characteristics (e.g., grandparental 
health) that affect female labor supply behavior and informal child care availability may lead to 
spurious correlation. One previously attempted solution to this identification issue leverages the 
arguably exogenous variation in grandparent-provided child care generated by either the 
grandparents’ being alive or their retirement eligibility.3 For example, Arpino et al. (2014) employ 
data from the 2003 wave of the Italian National Statistical Institute’s (ISTAT) multipurpose 
“Family and Social Subjects Survey” (FSSS), which collects information on a mother’s use of 
grandparental child care. By instrumenting the latter with grandparents being alive or not, these 
                                                            
3 Other studies proxy grandparental availability for child care by exploiting variations in their geographic proximity 
based on the assumption that the closer the grandparents live to their children or children-in-law, the more available 
they are for child care (e.g. Compton and Pollak 2014). However, residential choices of both the women and their 
grandparents may be endogenous. Women who are more labor market oriented, for instance, may more greatly value 
living close to their parents and having a potential source of low cost child care. The same criticism applies to studies 
that examine the effect on women’s labor market outcomes of grandparents residing with the family (Leibowitz et al. 
1992, Ogawa and Ermisch 1996, Abendroth et al. 2012) without addressing this arrangement’s potential endogeneity. 
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authors estimate that using grandparent-provided child care raises a mother’s likelihood of being in 
the labor market by 32.3 percentage points.4 In earlier work, Posadas and Vidal-Fernandez (2013) 
apply a similar identification strategy to U.S. panel data to demonstrate a positive effect on 
women’s LFP. Their instrumental variable (IV) estimates, however, are much lower (14.6 
percentage points) and less precise (p-value = 0.29) than those reported by Arpino et al. (2014) for 
Italy, partly perhaps because of the two countries’ different institutional settings.5  
Neither of these studies, however, takes into account that surviving grandparents may greatly 
differ in the amount of time they can devote to child care, an aspect acknowledged in two recent 
papers that exploit the grandparental labor market differences generated by changes in retirement 
eligibility rules. In the first, Aparicio-Fenoll and Vidal-Fernandez (2015; hereafter, AFVF) use 
pension eligibility as an identification source in three waves (1998, 2003, and 2009) of the FSSS to 
investigate the effect of grandparental pension eligibility on female fertility and LFP. Using a two-
sample, two-stage least squares estimator, they show that the maternal grandmother’s LFP 
decreases her daughters’ LFP by 21.4 percentage points in the whole sample but surprisingly has a 
lower effect (14 percentage points) for the restricted sample of women with children under 3, whose 
child care needs are presumably greater. The authors also estimate a reduced form model in which 
the grandmother’s lack of pension eligibility is directly included in her daughter’s LFP, producing -
5.1 percentage point and -3.4 percentage point effects for the whole and restricted samples, 
respectively. In the other study, which uses only the 2009 wave of the FSSS, Battistin et al. (2015) 
exploit pension reform-generated exogenous variation to demonstrate a positive effect of 
grandparental retirement eligibility on female fertility. To explore potential channels for this effect, 
they also assess the impact of grandparental pension eligibility on employment, reporting estimated 
                                                            
4 A similar strategy, although not in an IV setting, was already employed by Del Boca (2002) using data from the 
Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). The author proxies informal child care availability by reports of at 
least one grandparent being alive, which she then links positively to maternal participation in Italy’s labor force. 
5 Based on their individual fixed effects estimates, which they deem the most reliable, Posadas and Vidal-Fernandez 
(2013) report that grandparental child care increases women’s LFP by 9 percentage points. 
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effect ranges between 4 and 2.5 percentage points that are concentrated among women under 35 and 
decrease with a woman’s age. 
The conceptual framework outlined above also highlights certain potential weaknesses in the 
previous literature using IV estimation. First, instrumental variables require not only that the 
excluded instruments be exogenous but also that the so-called exclusion restriction assumption 
hold. In our simple framework, the latter implies that grandparental deaths and pension eligibilities 
should not affect female LFP through channels other than informal child care provision, conditional 
on the variables included in the regressions. This assumption is likely to fail in our setting because 
the monetary transfers that a woman (or her partner) receives from her parents or in-laws – whose 
effect on her nonlabor income varies her LFP incentives – will likely depend on whether these 
relatives are alive (dead) or (non)employed. In the case of Posadas and Vidal-Fernandez (2013) and 
Arpino et al. (2014), for instance, in order for the exclusion restriction to hold, women with 
deceased parents (in-laws) must have the same nonlabor income availability as those whose parents 
(in- laws) are still alive. In reality, however, such may not be the case. On the one hand, early loss 
of a parent (in-law) may entail lower wealth accumulation and lower expected intervivo transfers 
and inheritances, generating an income or wealth effect on labor supply. On the other hand, if one 
parent (or in-law) dies, a woman may immediately receive some wealth in the form of inheritance, 
which could soften household budget constraints, especially when capital markets are imperfect, 
and the additional resources might partly be used to buy costly external child care. Thus, the effect 
of cash and wealth transfers may reinforce or countervail that of grandparent-provided child care, 
although in general, it is difficult to assess the bias of the estimates ex-ante when this channel is 
neglected.  
A similar, although presumably less strong, argument can also be made for grandparental 
retirement eligibility. The IV strategy used by AFVF (2015) relies heavily on the assumption that 
women with pension eligible and noneligible grandparents’ receive the same monetary and wealth 
transfers. Since they have no information on such variables, they are thus forced to assume this 
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parity because only then is the exclusion restriction valid. In this respect, a major contribution of 
our paper is that our data set permits us to include explicit proxies of intervivo transfers and 
inheritance received by the women and their partners (Section VI.B), allowing us to disentangle the 
child care provision channel from other potential effects of grandparental pension eligibility.  
Other contributions with respect to the extant literature include the fact that although our 
identification strategy is similar to that in AFVF (2015), ours uses both age-based retirement 
pension and contribution-year based seniority pension rules to define grandparental pension 
eligibility.  At the same time, in contrast to Battistin et al. (2015), our definition of retirement 
pension eligibility does not assume continuous working lives which, although probably innocuous 
for grandfathers, could lead to a substantial overestimation of grandmother eligibility given the 
share of mothers who experience career interruptions or even permanent exit from the labor market 
around childbearing (Pronzato 2009).6 Any such overestimation (or underestimation) of 
grandparental eligibility (a misclassification error) may lead to an attenuation bias in the estimates 
(Lewbel 2007). Battistin et al. (2015) also use retrospective data to reconstruct lifecycle labor 
supply, which, as the authors acknowledge, may be problematic for analyzing labor market 
behavior because of possible recall errors. By considering only information on mothers’ current 
employment, we minimize the impact of this recall bias.  
A further more substantive difference from both AFVF (2015) and Battistin et al. (2015) is 
that instead of considering the effect on LFP of all women, we focus only on mothers. Although 
both effects are of interest, they are potentially different. Our study thus throws light on the 
potential effect of raising retirement eligibility requirements on the LFP of women who are already 
mothers via deprivation of grandparental child care. Previous research in contrast, estimates the 
labor supply effect as the average effect on the whole female population, both mothers and 
nonmothers. This average effect, however, could differ if, for instance, the reforms induced the 
                                                            
6 Also problematic is neglecting employment sector and type and/or applying private sector rules to all grandmothers, 
since it leads to a less precise measure of retirement eligibility.  
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former to decrease LFP in response to losing grandparental child care but motivated the latter to 
postpone or reduce fertility and so increase their labor supply.7 The total effect on women’s LFP 
would then be ambiguously signed. Other important differences are our inclusion of women with 
deceased grandparents and allowance for differential effects on maternal LFP of the child care 
availability of grandparents who never worked versus those who worked and are now pension 
eligible. As discussed in the next section, we expect these two grandparental caregiver types to have 
very different effects on female LFP, a theoretical prediction that is indeed supported by the 
empirical analysis (see Section VI).  
 
III. Using Pension Reforms to Identify the Effect of Grandparental Child Care  
A. A Brief History of Pension Reforms in Italy 
Three major reforms were implemented in Italy during the 1990s to control severe imbalances 
in the public pension system. Prior to 1992, both retirement requirement and benefit amounts were 
very generous, with private sector workers allowed to retire at 60 (55 for women) with at least 15 
years of contributions (age-based retirement pension) or after 35 years of contributions, independent 
of age (seniority pension).8 The amount of the benefit was based both on contributory years and 
earnings received during the last working years, with a private sector worker receiving 2 percent of 
the average earnings of the last five years before retirement for every year of contribution paid. The 
steep earning profiles of most workers resulted in very generous benefits, leading to a record 1992 
benefits/GDP ratio of 16 percent, which raised the issue of system sustainability and triggered 
changes in the retirement age and benefits of current and future workers.  
In the more general framework of public deficit reduction, the first emergency attempt to 
balance the pension system budget was the so-called Amato reform (D.Lgs.503/1992), which 
gradually increased both age and contribution requirements by five years. Two years later, the Dini 
                                                            
7 Some recent studies using presumably exogenous variation in motherhood or family size to estimate the “motherhood” 
or “child” penalty include Bailey (2006), Cruces and Galiani (2007), Cristia (2008), and Càceres-Delpiano (2012).  
8 Requirements for public sector workers were even more generous (see Table 1).  
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reform (L.724/1994 and L.335/1995) reorganized the system so substantially as to imply a 
transition from earnings-based to contribution-based benefit computation while decreasing the age 
requirement but increasing the contribution requirement. It also introduced and regulated a parallel 
(voluntary) private pension system, which, however, applied only to individuals starting their first 
job after 1995 or voluntarily opting for the new system.9 Finally, the Prodi reform (L.449/1997) 
modified the part of the Dini reform targeted at older workers, slightly increasing the age 
requirements and harmonizing the rules for public and private sector employees and self-employed 
workers.  
Table 1 summarizes the minimum age and contribution requirements set by the different 
reforms for private employees, public employees, and self-employed workers, which we use in the 
paper to define individual eligibility for a state pension.10 As previously explained, workers had 
some discretion in choosing the requirements-benefits scheme, so for each of the three laws, we 
report the minimum requirements for every year (half-year for those enacted by July 1) according to 
gender and employment sector and type. The first column refers to the 1992 Amato reform; the 
second to the 1995 Dini reform for older workers, as modified by the 1997 Prodi reform; and the 
third to the 1995 Dini reform for the most recent cohorts of workers. These latter requirements are 
relevant because older individuals could opt for this system. To illustrate, before the 1992 Amato 
reform, a 62-year-old male working in the public sector with 30 years of contributions was pension 
eligible based on both age (60 for public sector workers) and seniority (20 years for public sector 
workers). In 1993, after the Amato reform, an identical individual was eligible only for a seniority 
pension because the retirement age had been raised. After 1996, an individual with the same 
characteristics would have been ineligible based on age (Amato), contribution years (Dini-Prodi), or 
both (Dini). Hence, consistent with the opportunity to choose the requirement, we assume that 
workers are eligible for a state pension whenever they satisfy at least one of the three criteria. 
                                                            
9 Only in 2012 (Fornero reform, D.L.201/2011) was the contribution-based system (partially) extended to all workers. 
This reform, however, is outside our period of analysis. 
10 Workers in certain sectors (e.g., arduous or hazardous jobs like mining or long-distance driving) might have different 
requirements, but we disregard these in our paper. 
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B. Empirical Strategy 
Although we seek to reveal how grandparental child care determines mothers’ LFP, our data 
contain no information on whether and how much time grandparents spend with their grandchildren 
(a variable that would anyway be endogenous to women’s labor market outcomes). Therefore, 
rather than directly relating women’s employment to grandparental child care, we correlate the 
mothers’ LFP with their parents’ and in-laws’ potential availability for child care by estimating a 
model of the following form: 
 
ݕ௜௧ = ߙ + ∑ ൫ߚଵ௞ܰ ௜ܹ௧௞ + ߚଶ௞ܧܮ௜௧௞ +ߚଷ௞ܰܧܮ௜௧௞ ൯ + ௜ܺ௧ߛᇱସ௞ୀଵ + ߬௥௧ + ݑ௜௧   (3)   
       
where ݕ௜௧ is a dummy capturing whether woman i is in the labor force or not in year t. Our main 
variables of interest are the three dummy variables ܰ ௜ܹ௧௞, ܧܮ௜௧௞ , ܰܧܮ௜௧௞  which capture the potential 
availability for child care of each relative k=1,…4, when 1 and 2 are the woman’s mother and 
mother-in-law, respectively, and 3 and 4, her father and father-in-law. More specifically, ܰ ௜ܹ௧௞ is 
equal to 1 if individual k is alive and has never worked (i.e., has always been out of the labor force) 
and 0 otherwise, and ܧܮ௜௧௞  (ܰܧܮ௜௧௞ ) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individual k is alive and 
(in)eligible for a state pension (based on the pension eligibility rules outlined in the previous 
subsection). If individual k is not alive, all three variables take the value 0. We also control for all 
time variant region-specific factors that might affect female employment by including region by 
year fixed effects (߬௥௧), which, among other things, capture differences in the socioeconomic 
environment (e.g., unemployment) and public child care provision. Finally, ௜ܺ௧ is a vector of 
individual-level variables that may also affect women’s labor supply and employment, including 
age and education of individual i, and her parents and in-laws, partner’s income and education, and 
size of the municipality of residence. In the most saturated version of the model, this vector also 
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includes the grandparents’ employment sector (private or public) and type (employee or self-
employed). 
We exploit two sources of variation to identify the effect of interest: The first is cross-
sectional variation determined by differences in the grandparents’ gender, education, and 
employment sector and type. These latter are generally associated with different ages of entry into 
the labor market (and thus years of pension contributions conditional on age), as well as different 
retirement ages even under the same laws (which tend to favor public employees and women). The 
second is time variation resulting from the pension rule changes introduced by the different reforms 
passed during our estimation period. In addition to estimating models that exploit each of these two 
variations, we also compute a more saturated model including all factors determining the 
grandparental eligibility status, meaning that identification comes only from time variations in the 
reform-induced eligibility rules. This saturated model enables comparison of like with like; for 
example, women with parents and in-laws having exactly the same characteristics but whose 
retirement eligibility status varies because of the law in place at the time. It also controls for 
grandparent characteristics that, in addition to determining their eligibility status, may also have a 
direct effect on female employment (e.g., age, gender, education, and employment sector and 
type).11 
We are primarily interested in the role of grandparents as potential providers of child care, and 
estimate accordingly Equation (3) on a sample of women with young children. Our estimation 
sample includes every woman aged 20–49 who has at least one child under 15 living in the 
household. As a validity check, we also estimate it for the sample of women in the same age range 
who have no children under 15 living in the household and for the sample of their male partners. 
We focus our attention on the coefficients ߚଵ௞, ߚଶ௞, ߚଷ௞, which (multiplied by 100) respectively 
                                                            
11 Omitting these controls may lead to a spurious correlation between grandparental pension eligibility and female LFP. 
However, the estimates obtained with the saturated models are robust to the presence of time-invariant unobservable 
grandparent characteristics that drive their educational and employment choices and may also be correlated with female 
employment. The main assumption is that grandparents who made the same educational and employment choices have 
similar unobservable characteristics.  
 16 
 
indicate by how many percentage points a mother is more or less likely to participate in the labor 
force if her relative k has always been out of the labor force, is eligible for state pension and thus 
potentially retired from the work force, or is not yet eligible for state pension and thus potentially 
still employed (or job hunting) relative to the case in which k is dead. Given the predominance of 
women in child care provision, we expect to find a positive effect of the availability of maternal and 
paternal grandmothers for child care on the women’s LFP probability but a lower (or no) effect of 
grandfathers’ availability. 
Unlike most previous studies, rather than focusing only on the child care availability of 
maternal grandmothers, we examine that of all grandparents to avoid any omitted variable bias from 
its correlating with maternal grandmother availability (e.g., because of similar characteristics like 
age or education) and affecting women’s LFP. On the other hand, considering the aggregate number 
of available grandparents could hide heterogeneous effects across grandparents, so for this reason 
we consider the potential availability for child care of each grandparent individually. We also 
include in the estimation sample both women whose parents or in-laws were not alive at the time of 
interview and those whose parents or in-laws had never participated in the labor market. These two 
characteristics enable us to not only compute the effect on women’s employment of not having 
living parents and/or in-laws, but also to test for the presence of heterogeneous effects from parents 
or in-laws who are available either because they never worked or because they worked in the past 
and are now retired. These two groups may in fact have very different effects on women’s LFP. We 
expect that ߚଵ௞ may partly capture cultural effects in addition to the child care availability effect. In 
particular, an intergenerational correlation is possible between a grandmother’s employment and her 
daughter’s, reflecting either unobservable variables correlated across generations or a true causal 
relation (e.g., a gender role model).12 Conversely, any negative intergenerational correlation 
between a woman’s LFP and her mother’s never having participated in the labor market may be 
partly countervailed by the positive effect produced by the latter’s provision of informal child care. 
                                                            
12 See, for instance, Farre and Vella (2013). 
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The sign of the net effect is therefore an empirical question. Because it is generally hard to find a 
convincing exogenous source of variation in parental (especially, maternal) lifetime LFP, rather 
than attaching a strictly causal interpretation to the estimate of ߚଵ௞, we consider it only suggestive of 
potential heterogeneous effects by source of availability. Instead, our main parameter of interest is 
ߚଶ௞ − ߚଷ௞, the difference between retirement eligible and ineligible parents or in-laws (whoever 
worked). These two groups, although very similar in terms of the unobservable variables driving 
labor force attachment, differ only in their pension rule-induced employment status. We thus 
interpret this difference causally.  
Three other features of our analysis are worth noting. First, unlike those in IV-based studies, 
our estimation strategy does not require that the grandparent’s retirement eligibility have only an 
indirect effect on women’s LFP via grandparental child care. Rather, part of the reduced form 
(gross) effect estimated of the grandparents’ retirement eligibility on the women’s LFP may be 
produced by additional causal pathways and not exclusively by grandparental child care. Therefore, 
to evaluate the relevance of this latter, we implement several placebo tests; in particular, an 
estimation of Equation (3) that assesses whether the effects are larger for individuals with a greater 
need for child care than for those who need it less (e.g., women vs. men, women with young 
children vs. other women). Second, unlike previous researchers, we are able to include control 
variables that capture certain alternative pathways through which grandparental pension eligibility 
may affect female LFP, in particular, intervivo transfers and inheritances. Lastly, by focusing on 
parental and in-law retirement eligibility and not on current retirement status (an endogenous choice 
variable), we are able to address a potential reverse causality bias; namely, that some grandparents 
may anticipate their retirement to take care of their grandchildren whose mothers are working 
(Lumsdaine and Vermeer 2014).13  
                                                            
13 More generally, Ho (2015) and Rupert and Zanella (2014), among others, show that grandparents’ labor supply may 
be affected by the presence of grandchildren. 
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Additionally, note that since not all eligible grandparents actually decide to retire, and not all 
retired grandparents provide child care to their children’s family, our intention-to-treat estimates 
must be interpreted as lower bound estimates of the effect of grandparent-provided child care on 
maternal employment. 
 
IV. Data 
Our analysis is based on data from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW),14 
administered by the Bank of Italy every two years15 to a rotating panel of 8,000 households 
(approximately 24,000 individuals) per year. In addition to focusing on labor market and income-
related issues, the survey also gathers information on such relevant topics as education, socio-
demographics, consumption, and dwelling characteristics. Besides providing full information on all 
household members, household heads and their partners also report the birth year, labor market 
status, educational attainment, and alive or dead status of their parents,16 which we use to analyze 
grandparental availability for child care. Because of data availability and comparability, we focus 
on the seven waves covering 1993–2006, for a total potential population of 55,163 households. 
Because the relevant survey unit in the SHIW is the household, for every unit in the sample 
we use both household-specific (e.g., residential region, household size and composition) and 
individual-specific (e.g., demographics, education, labor market outcomes, income) variables for all 
household members. We also exploit the information on the household heads and their partners’ 
parents. To study the effects of grandparent availability on maternal labor market outcomes, 
however, we must restrict our sample to a subset of relevant households containing a cohabiting 
couple who are potential or actual parents. We therefore select all households that include two 
partners, one a female aged 20-49 for whom we have complete information on both the dependent 
                                                            
14 “Indagine sui bilanci delle famiglie italiane” (Banca d'Italia). 
15 Except for a three-year interval between 1995 and 1998. 
16 For 1998, information on whether grandparents were alive is missing, so for that year, we exploit the panel dimension 
of SHIW and recover, where possible, the information from other waves. 
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and independent variables. This selection reduces the sample to 13,443 couples, 8,402 (62.5 
percent) of whom are parents to at least one child younger than 15 living in the household, while the 
remaining 5,041 couples (37.5 percent) either have no offspring or have only children older than 14 
or living outside the household. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for our sample. The women are on average younger 
than their partners by about 3.5 years, slightly more educated, with a considerably lower LFP rate, 
about 53 percent for females versus 98 percent for males. Interestingly, the female participation rate 
increases with the age of the children: from 57 percent for women with no children or children older 
than 14 in the household to 52 percent for women with children younger than 6. The grandmothers 
in the sample are consistently about four years younger than the grandfathers, and the maternal 
grandparents are four years younger than both paternal grandparents. The grandmothers, however, 
are less educated than their partners, and their LFP is dramatically lower, less than 30 percent 
versus about 93 percent for grandfathers. The share of grandparents that are not alive also varies 
substantially, from a minimum of 15 percent for maternal grandmothers to a maximum of 42 
percent for paternal grandfathers. These differences result from the different birth cohorts: 
grandfathers are older than grandmothers and men older than women, so that paternal grandfathers 
are the least likely and maternal grandmothers the most likely to be alive. 
 
V. Pension Eligibility and Retirement 
In this paper, we seek to assess the importance of informal child care provision by 
grandparents, proxied by their potential availability, on maternal LFP. As described in Section III, 
we divide the grandparents’ potential availability into four categories: not alive, never having 
worked (ܹܰ), or in the labor market and either pension eligible (ܧܮ) or pension ineligible (ܰܧܮ). 
Because the SHIW asks respondents directly about their parents’ labor market participation, age, 
birth year, and employment sector and type, we have all the information needed to determine 
pension eligibility, except for years of contribution. To derive this variable, we exploit the fact that 
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the SHIW does record years of pension contributions for all individuals interviewed. First, we 
regress the actual contribution years on a set of individual characteristics (gender, age, education, 
employment sector and type, year, and region) available for both the grandparent cohort17 and the 
surveyed individual cohort and then predict the grandparents’ years of contribution on the basis of 
the estimated coefficients.18 Once these predictions are obtained, we have all necessary information 
to determine whether every grandparent satisfies at least one of the pension requirements and is thus 
eligible or ineligible for a pension.  
We test pension eligibility as a valid predictor of retirement status by running simple 
regressions of actual individual retirement status of all surveyed individuals (albeit separately for 
men and women) on both a constant and imputed pension eligibility indicator. The coefficients 
estimated on this eligibility indicator are 0.719 (SE = 0.006) for men and 0.857 (SE = 0.005) for 
women,19 which, when considered together with our main results (reported below), support the 
validity of pension eligibility as a predictor of potential child care availability based on actual 
retirement.  
As already emphasized, rather than relying solely on individual age to define pension 
eligibility (as in AFVF, 2015), we exploit both age-based retirement pension rules and seniority 
pension rules by combining age with sector of employment, type of activity, and predicted years of 
contribution. This technique is a major improvement in identification strategy not only because 
many of the formerly employed individuals in the grandparent cohort began working at a very 
young age but because a relevant share of grandparents not meeting the retirement age condition are 
likely to satisfy the seniority pension criterion of contribution years. In fact, Table 3 does indeed 
                                                            
17 Parents’ (in-laws’) sectors and types of employment are measured when they had the same age as the respondent 
(spouse). In case they were unemployed at that time, the characteristics of the last job are reported. 
18 The regression results are reported in Appendix A. All regressions using retirement eligibility based on predicted 
contribution years are bootstrapped (1,000 replications) to account for its being a generated regressor.  
19 Potential eligibility is a better predictor of actual retirement for women than for men, which suggests that (because of 
special rules for hazardous jobs, as stressed in footnote 10) men anticipate or postpone retirement with respect to 
pension eligibility, while women are more tied to it. Men could decide to postpone retirement with respect to the 
minimum eligible age more frequently than women for several reasons, including higher income, a good enough health 
status to work, social norms, and/or a higher psychological costs of retirement. 
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reveal a notable percentage of grandparents eligible based on the contribution requirement while 
still not meeting the age criterion: 30.5% of fathers, 28.6% of mothers, 33.5% of fathers-in-law, and 
33.2% of mothers-in-law. Thus, neglecting the seniority pension criterion would lead to a 
substantial underestimation of grandparental eligibility, potentially reducing the estimated impact of 
pension eligibility on female LFP. 
 
VI. Effect of Grandparental Availability on Maternal Labor Force Participation 
A. Main Results 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating Equation (3) for a sample of women aged 20–49 who 
are either household heads or partners and mothers to at least one child under 15 living in the 
household. In all cases, the columns reporting the different specifications display the estimated 
coefficients on the three dummy variables ܹܰ, ܧܮ, and ܰܧܮ for the woman’s mother (maternal 
grandmother), mother-in-law (paternal grandmother), father (maternal grandfather) and father-in-
law (paternal grandfather). Column (1) lists the outcomes for the basic specification, which includes 
only these 12 variables of interest together with region-by-year fixed effects and dummies for 
municipality size (<20,000, 20,000–40,000, 40,000–500,000, >500,000 inhabitants). Column (2) 
reports the results for an enriched specification that controls for grandparental educational level (up 
to lower secondary, upper secondary or tertiary, and above), which may proxy for downstream 
monetary transfers to women, a major channel through which working grandparents may affect 
women’s LFP. It also controls for grandparents’ age, which in addition to affecting their pension 
eligibility may also affect their health status and thus a daughter(-in-law)’s LFP. Column (3) adds in 
a quadratic form for the woman’s age and dummies for her educational level, which may 
significantly affect her employment probability. Column (4) then integrates controls for partner’s 
education and income, both of which may affect female LFP. Our key result is consistent 
throughout all specifications: having a mother who is eligible for a state pension has a positive and 
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strongly statistically significant effect on the probability of labor force participation for a 20- to 49-
year-old woman who is mother to a resident child under 15.  
The magnitude of the effects implied by the estimates in column (4) is sizable: having a 
pension eligible mother implies that her daughter is 10.7 percentage points more likely to 
participate in the labor force than women whose mother has died, and 8.1 percentage points more 
likely than those whose mother is currently pension ineligible.20 In our sample, the LFP probability 
of women whose mother is dead is 44 percent compared to 62 percent for women whose mother is 
not yet pension eligible, implying that a mothers’ pension eligibility increases her daughter’s 
employment probability by 24 percent relative to having a dead mother and by 13 percent relative to 
having a mother who is still working. Interestingly, our estimates show no availability effect for 
never employed mothers: in this case, the positive effect of availability for child care is presumably 
offset by the negative effect of family cultural influences (see Section III). Results in column (4) 
also indicate that a mother-in-law’s (paternal grandmother’s) pension eligibility implies an increase 
in LFP probability relative not only to women whose mother-in-law has died but also relative to 
women whose mother-in-law has never worked. Conversely, however, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the effect of a working mother-in-law is the same as that of a pension eligible 
mother-in-law: the effect for paternal grandmothers, therefore, does not seem to originate from their 
availability as suppliers of child care.21  
The models used in columns (1)–(4) of Table 4 identify the effect of grandparental retirement 
eligibility by simultaneously exploiting within-year and between-year variation across individuals. 
Because grandparental eligibility is imputed based on observable characteristics, some of which are 
excluded from the LFP equation (i.e., employment sector and type), one possible criticism is that 
these characteristics may also have a direct effect on maternal employment. Hence, in column (5), 
                                                            
20 The latter effect is measured based on ߚଶ − ߚଷ, which is reported at the bottom of each column. A test for the 
hypothesis that ߚଶ = ߚଷ rejects the null with a p-value of 0.016. 
21 Although it would be tempting to interpret these results as further evidence for the role of social norms, together with 
assortative mating, our most complete specification (column (5)) indicates that once the maternal and paternal 
grandparents’ employment sector and type are controlled for, paternal grandmothers no longer have an effect on the 
daughter-in-law’s LFP probability. 
 23 
 
we add in dummies for public sector employment and self-employment, allowing us to compare the 
effect on maternal employment of having grandparents with exactly the same observable 
characteristics but different pension eligibility. Because grandparental pension eligibility as defined 
in Section V is a nonlinear function of these characteristics, even in this saturated model, we still 
exploit some cross-sectional variation across individuals in grandparental availability. Nevertheless, 
most identification is achieved through variation in pension eligibility rules over time resulting from 
the pension reforms described in Section III. This claim is verified by Figure 2, which reports the R-
squared of year-specific regressions of each grandparent’s pension eligibility status on its 
determinants. The R-squared is very high in all years, and it increases over time as pension 
eligibility becomes increasingly linked to years of contribution, from about 0.75 in 1993 to 0.95 in 
the 2000s. Thus, after 2000, almost all variation in eligibility status comes from pension reforms. 
Quite reassuringly, even in the saturated model in column (5), we find that a maternal 
grandmother’s retirement eligibility has a (marginally) significant 8.5 percentage point greater 
effect on her daughter’s LFP probability relative to women whose mothers are dead, which is only 
marginally smaller than the estimate in column (4). The difference between the coefficients on 
“mother alive and ineligible” and “mother alive and eligible” amounts to 7.1 percentage points, a 11 
percent increase in probability relative to women with ineligible mothers. Moreover, our column (5) 
estimates show no statistically significant effect of either maternal grandfathers or paternal 
grandparents on maternal LFP. It is also interesting to note that the coefficients of mother-in-law 
eligible and mother-in-law ineligible in column (4) are very similar, suggesting a LFP premium that 
is likely to be related to the mother-in-law’s LFP status rather than to her pension eligibility status, 
an observation confirmed by the drop in both coefficients in column (5) when grandparental 
employment characteristics are included. In fact, this latter completely absorbs the effect of paternal 
grandmothers’ current or past employment status.22 
                                                            
22 Even in the presence of unobserved characteristics that are correlated with grandparental employment sector or type, 
we still consider the contrast ߚଶ௞ − ߚଷ௞ to be a valid estimate of the effect of having pension eligible grandparents, 
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B. Insights on the Causal Pathway 
Until now, we have shown that women whose mothers are retirement eligible are significantly 
more likely to participate in the labor market, an effect that does not hold true for the eligibility of 
their mothers-in-law. We therefore wonder whether grandparental (potential) availability for child 
care is a plausible explanation for this finding. If so, we would expect to find evidence that maternal 
grandparents (grandmothers) are more likely to provide child care than paternal grandparents 
(grandmothers). Extant research supports this view: a greater investment in child care by maternal 
grandmothers is a very robust pattern in the sociological, psychological, and evolutionary literature 
(Coall et al. 2014), one recorded for several countries, including the UK, the U.S., Australia, Italy, 
and Norway (see Whelan 2013, Arpino et al. 2014).  
We further check the plausibility of the child care explanation in several interrelated ways. 
First, we re-estimate Equation (3) for a sample of female household heads or their partners, again in 
the 20–49 age range, who are not mothers to any cohabiting children under the age of 15. For these 
women, the potential availability of maternal or paternal grandparents for child care should have no 
effect on LFP. We report the results for this alternative sample in column (2) of Table 5 with a 
focus on the most complete specification (equivalent to that in column (5) of Table 4, whose results 
we repeat for convenience in column (1) of Table 5). These outcomes offer further support for our 
interpretation of the effects: for women who have no cohabiting children under 15, there is no 
indication of a positive effect of the availability of maternal or paternal grandparents on LFP.  
We then perform an even more informative validation test for our proposed explanation by 
estimating Equation (3) on the subsample of male partners in the estimation sample. Because men 
are typically less involved in child care activities23 (especially in a Southern European country like 
Italy), we expect no positive effect of grandparental availability on their LFP unless this availability 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
because these characteristics are similar across both eligible and ineligible grandparents working in the same 
employment sector and type. Moreover, later in this section, we also report regression results using definitions of 
retirement eligibility that are not based on grandparental labor market characteristics. 
23 See, for example, OECD (2001) and Bloemen et al. (2010).  
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affects labor market behavior through a channel other than child care. These results, reported in 
column (3) of Table 5, indicate that maternal grandparental pension eligibility has no effect on these 
men’s LFP.  
A further test for the plausibility of the child care channel as the main driver of our results 
relies on the fact that the child care burden may be especially high during the child’s earliest years, 
so it is then that family child care support may be most important in determining maternal LFP. If 
the availability of child care by a grandmother is driving our results, then the younger her 
daughter’s children, the stronger the effect of the grandmother’s pension eligibility should become. 
Hence, in the last two columns of Table 5, we restrict our sample to women who have children 
under the age of 11 (column (4)) and under the age of 6 (column (5)). As expected, the estimated 
effect of a grandmother’s pension eligibility increases from a baseline of 0.085 for women with 
children up to 14 to 0.104 and 0.203 for women whose children are under 11 and under 6 
(compulsory school entry age), respectively. These estimates imply that women whose children are 
under 11 and whose mothers are pension eligible are 11 percent (6.5 percentage points) more likely 
to participate in the labor force than women whose children are in the same age range but whose 
mother is not yet pension eligible. The same difference increases to 25 percent (14.8 percentage 
points) for women whose children are under 6. 
A distinctive feature of SHIW data, compared to the FSSS data used in previous work for Italy 
(see Section II), is that it provides information on monetary and house transfers received by a 
woman or her partner from parents and in-laws on monetary transfers from relatives and friends and 
on home ownership. This provision allows us to sterilize some potential confounders of the effect of 
grandparent-provided child care by including additional regressors aimed at capturing potentially 
concomitant effects of grandparental retirement eligibility in Equation (3) (e.g., those mediated by 
wealth effects). Table 6 thus includes monetary transfers and alternative dummy variables for the 
following: (i) being owner of the dwelling (vs. rent or free use), which controls for a wealth effect; 
ii) having received the dwelling as a gift, which controls for any additional effect of severance 
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payments received upon retirement in terms of wealth transfer from grandparents; and (iii) having 
received the dwelling as an inheritance or gift or being able to use it for free, which controls for any 
additional financial resources that a household may devote to formal or external child care. These 
three variables are highly correlated, and, as shown in columns (1)–(3), the corresponding models 
exhibit virtually no differences from the baseline model (reported in column (1)). This finding is 
reassuring evidence of no correlation between eligibility and wealth or monetary transfers, at least 
as far as these can be measured using the SHIW variables as proxies. 
 
C. Heterogeneous Effects 
We investigate potential heterogeneity in the grandparental eligibility effect based on two 
factors: women’s educational levels and the potential supply of external child care. Because less 
educated women generally command lower wages in the labor market, their LFP and employment 
decisions are more sensitive to the availability of low-cost, flexible grandparent-provided child care 
than those of highly educated women, who may have access to external child care (Hofferth and 
Wissoker 1992, Powell 2002). To check this prediction, in column (2) of Table 7, we estimate a 
saturated model (reported for convenience in column (1)) that additionally includes the interactions 
between maternal grandmother’s eligibility and the educational attainment of the women in our 
sample of mothers with cohabiting children. We define as highly educated those women who have 
completed upper secondary education or more, and as less educated, those who have completed 
lower secondary education or less.24 Less educated women with pension eligible mothers are 9.7 
percentage points more likely to be employed than their counterparts with ineligible mothers, a 
difference that is significant at the 10 percent level. In contrast, the effect for highly educated 
women, albeit positive, is about 5 percentage points smaller and statistically insignificant. 
                                                            
24 Our definitions are motivated by the fact that in Italy (unlike in the U.S.), tertiary educational achievement is very 
low. Nevertheless, the results remain robust to defining only women with a university degree as highly educated. 
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Because external child care could be a substitute for grandparent-provided child care, we 
expect the effect of grandparental eligibility to be larger when women have access to fewer child 
care alternatives. Since public and private formal child care is likely to be more abundant in larger 
municipalities, in column (3) of Table 7, we report the estimates from a model that interacts 
grandparental eligibility with the size of the municipality of residence. The results are consistent 
with theoretical expectations. In smaller municipalities (20,000 inhabitants or less), the eligible-
ineligible grandmother difference amounts to 11.2 percentage points, while in larger municipalities 
(over 20,000 inhabitants), the difference is much smaller (2.5 percentage points) and statistically 
insignificant.25 
 
D. Robustness Checks and Further Evidence 
Due to space constraints, we report in Appendix B a number of additional analyses that we 
have performed to check the robustness and sensitivity of our results. Specifically, we have: 
replaced the dependent variable with, alternatively, employment status, weekly working hours, 
hourly wages, annual earnings; used alternative definitions of pension eligibility; accounted for self-
selection into motherhood with a Heckman sample selection model. All these additional checks 
strengthen the results of our analysis.  
 
VII. Discussion 
Our finding that women whose mothers are unavailable for child care suffer a nonnegligible 
employment penalty relative to those who can potentially count on such informal assistance throws 
light on the unintended consequences of pension reforms on maternal labor force participation. In 
                                                            
25 This result, however, is only suggestive and should be interpreted with caution. First, detailed data on child care 
availability are only available for recent years; for example, ISTAT only provides regional indicators on public child 
care since 2004. Second, the supply of public child care is likely to be endogenous and mainly demand driven. Hence, 
using data from 2004, we regress on a regional level the logarithm of the percentage of municipalities that implemented 
child care services on the logarithm of the percentage of municipalities with over 20,000 inhabitants (controlling for 
macro area indicators) and obtain an elasticity of 0.49 (t = 1.98). In the absence of better data, we take this result as 
suggestive of child care services being more abundant in larger municipalities. 
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particular, such reforms are likely to penalize women whose mothers become unavailable because 
of a higher retirement age or stricter retirement requirements. On the other hand, it may also be 
useful to assess the aggregate effect of pension reforms on the average LFP of all women with 
children aged 0–14, an effect specific to this demographic group and not to female LFP overall. 
Overall female LFP may in fact increase if a higher retirement age translates into longer retention of 
women in the work force. What is likely to change is the distribution of LFP across different 
generations of women and between women with and without children. 
To throw light on this issue, we carry out back-of-the-envelope computations of the average 
LFP in our sample under different retirement rule scenarios while keeping the sample 
characteristics fixed. More specifically, we use two scenarios: a pre-Amato scenario and a Dini 
scenario, in which either the rules predating the Amato reform or the Dini rules (see Table 1) are 
assumed to be in place for the whole period. After first redefining maternal grandmother eligibility 
based on these different rule sets, we re-compute the average LFP for the sample. The results of this 
exercise are graphed in Figure 3. Subfigure (a) shows only a small impact of the retirement rules on 
average LFP, with year differences ranging between 0.80 (1993) and 0.97 (1998) percentage points 
(see appendix C). These differences correspond to about a 1.7 percent decline in the labor force 
participation of mothers. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that the main drivers of the average 
LFP differences between the two scenarios are the differences in share of pension eligible 
grandmothers produced by the retirement rules. These latter depend in turn on the demographic 
characteristics of our estimation sample. For example, high maternal age at first birth is likely to 
reduce the reform’s impact on female LFP in that most women will then have mothers who are old 
enough to be retirement eligible no matter what rules we consider in our simulations. Subfigure (b) 
then reports the aggregate effect on mothers of preschool children (0–5), for whom, consistent with 
the results in Table 4, column (5), the interscenario differences increase. We now observe 
differences between 2.3 (2000) and 2.9 (1998) percentage points, corresponding to a -4 percent and 
-5.5 percent decrease in maternal LFP. Another potential determinant of the pension reforms’ low 
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impact in the sample of all mothers (i.e., with children 0–14) may be that a substantial proportion of 
maternal grandmothers have never participated in the labor market and so are unaffected by the 
retirement rule changes. Thus, in subfigure (c), which reports the same two scenarios but with 
average LFP predicted only for women whose mothers have worked, we observe a much larger gap: 
the Dini reform has a negative effect on the daughters’ LFP, which peaks in 2000 and amounts to a 
4.2 percent reduction relative to the actual baseline LFP of 67.7 percent.  
 
VIII. Concluding remarks 
In Southern European countries such as Italy, which are characterized by very low provision 
of public child care, grandparents offer women an important source of informal child care, which 
helps them reconcile family and working life. In this paper, therefore, we seek to quantify the effect 
of such grandparental availability on maternal employment. We focus on Italy for two reasons: 
First, its female employment rates are among the lowest in Europe, making it important to identify 
which factors are hindering the entry of more women into the workforce. Second, the changes in 
pension eligibility requirements introduced by Italy’s three recent major pension reforms provide 
exogenous variation in grandparental availability.  
Exploiting this exogenous variation, we estimate that mothers of children under 15 whose own 
mothers are retirement eligible have a 7.1 percentage points higher probability of participating in 
the labor force (+11 percent) than those whose mothers are ineligible. We interpret this effect to 
mean that the availability of maternal grandmothers for child care increases their daughters’ LFP, a 
conclusion supported by several robustness checks. In fact, we find no such effects for either 
women with no children under 15 or men and as could be expected, the magnitude of the effects is 
larger for women with very young children whose child care needs are most intensive. These 
findings remain robust even to considering female employment instead of LFP and addressing 
potential selection issues into motherhood. We also show that when fully enforced, the pension 
reforms imply a 1–1.5 percent yearly reduction on the LFP rates of women with children aged 0–14 
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and a 5.5 percent yearly reduction for those with children aged 0–5. Taken together, these results 
indicate that pension reforms that raise the retirement age, if not coupled with adequate investments 
in public child care, may have unintended negative consequences for the employment probabilities 
of females of child-bearing age by robbing households of an important source of flexible, low-cost 
child care. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1. Public expenditure on child care and early education services, percent of GDP, 2011 
 
Source: OECD Family Database (http://www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm), chart PF3.1. 
 
Figure 2. R-squared of year-specific regressions of each grandparent’s eligibility status on its determinants 
 
Note. The figure reports the R-squared of year-specific regressions of dichotomous indicators for each grandparent’s pension 
eligibility status (eligible or not) on their age, and dummies for educational attainment, public sector employment, self-employment 
and region of residence. 
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Table 1  
Eligibility Criteria of Italy’s Pension Reforms 
Law Amato reform Dini – Prodi reform Dini reform 
Criterion Age-based Seniority Age-based Seniority Seniority 
Sector Private 
Public and  
self-employed 
Private and  
self-
employed Public Private Public 
Self-
employed 
Private 
and  
public 
Self-
employed All 
Gender Males Females Males Females All All All All All All All All All 
Requirement Jointly Jointly Jointly Jointly Only Only Jointly Jointly Jointly Only Only Only Only 
  Age Contr. Age Contr. Age Contr. Age Contr. Contr. Contr. Age Contr. Age Contr. Age Contr. Contr. Contr. Age Contr. 
1993 60 15 55 15 65 15 60 15 35 20                     
1994 61 16 56 16 65 16 60 16 35 20                     
01-06/1995 61 17 56 17 65 17 60 17 35 20                     
07-12/1995 62 17 57 17 65 17 60 17 35 20                     
1996 62 17 57 17 65 17 60 17     52 36 52 36 52 36     65 40 
1997 63 18 58 18 65 18 60 18     52 36 52 36 52 36     65 40 
01-06/1998 63 18 58 18 65 18 60 18     54 35 53 35 57 35 36 40 65 40 
07-12/1998 64 18 59 18 65 18 60 18     54 35 53 35 57 35 36 40 65 40 
1999 64 19 59 19 65 19 60 19     55 35 53 35 57 35 37 40 65 40 
2000 65 19 60 19 65 19 60 19     55 35 54 35 57 35 37 40 65 40 
2001 65 20 60 20 65 20 60 20     56 35 55 35 58 35 37 40 65 40 
2002 65 20 60 20 65 20 60 20     57 35 55 35 58 35 37 40 65 40 
2003 65 20 60 20 65 20 60 20     57 35 56 35 58 35 37 40 65 40 
2004 65 20 60 20 65 20 60 20     57 35 57 35 58 35 38 40 65 40 
2005 65 20 60 20 65 20 60 20     57 35 57 35 58 35 38 40 65 40 
2006 65 20 60 20 65 20 60 20     57 35 57 35 58 35 39 40 65 40 
2007 65 20 60 20 65 20 60 20     57 35 57 35 58 35 39 40 65 40 
Note. This table reports the retirement age and contribution (Contr.) requirements of the different pension laws.
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Table 2  
Sample Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Women and their partners 
 Women Men 
 Freq.  % Freq. % 
In labor force (children 0–14) 4466 53.15 8224 97.88 
In labor force (children 0–10)* 3450/6479 53.25   
In labor force (children 0–5)* 1989/3803 52.30   
In labor force (no children 0–14)* 2893/5041 57.39   
Employed (children 0–14) 4253 50.62 7912 94.17 
Employed (children 0–10)* 3272/6479 50.50   
Employed (children 0–5)* 1878/3803 49.38   
Employed (no children 0–14)* 2772/5041 54.99   
Lower secondary or less 4028 47.94 4285 51.00 
Upper secondary 3463 41.22 3199 38.07 
Tertiary or above 911 10.84 918 10.93 
 Obs. Mean 
(SD) 
Obs. Mean 
(SD) 
Age 8402 37.0 
(5.97) 
8402 40.55 
(6.60) 
Income 8402 6932 
(9111) 
8402 21204 
(21457) 
 
Panel B: Grandparents 
 Mothers Mothers-in-law Fathers Fathers-in-law 
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Not alive 1247 14.84 1797 21.39 2806 33.40 3532 42.04 
Alive and never worked 4775 56.83 4626 55.06 126 1.50 106 1.26 
Alive and eligible 1715 20.41 1603 19.08 3686 43,87 3699 44.03 
Alive and ineligible 665 7.91 376 4.48 1784 21.21 1065 12.68 
Lower secondary or less 7685 91.47 7795 92.78 7335 87.30 7482 89.05 
Upper secondary 576 6.86 491 5.84 752 8.95 620 7.38 
Tertiary or above 141 1.68 116 1.38 315 3.75 300 3.57 
Private sector 1980 23.57 1868 22.23 6526 77.67 6580 78.31 
Public sector 534 6.36 417 4.96 1280 15.23 1310 15.59 
Never worked 5888 70.08 6117 72.80 596 7.09 512 6.09 
Self-employed 822 9.78 807 9.60 2129 25.34 2323 27.65 
 Obs. Mean 
(SD) 
Obs. Mean 
(SD) 
Obs. Mean 
(SD) 
Obs. Mean 
(SD) 
Age 8402 65.7 
(9.12) 
8402 69.0 
(9.47) 
8402 69.6 
(9.56) 
8402 73.1 
(10.07) 
Note. Except for the variables marked with an asterisk, whose sample size is reported next to the frequency, statistics are reported for 
the baseline sample of 8,402 women aged 20–49 who have at least one child under 15 living in the household.  
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Table 3 
Eligibility by different criteria 
   Eligibility according to age criterion only 
   Ineligible Eligible 
Eligibility 
Father 
Ineligible 984 670 
(%) 17.99 12.25 
Eligible 1668 2148 
(%) 30.49 39.27 
Mother 
Ineligible 491 174 
(%) 20.63 7.31 
Eligible 681 1034 
(%) 28.61 43.45 
Father-in-law 
Ineligible 548 433 
(%) 11.50 9.09 
Eligible 1595 2188 
(%) 33.48 45.93 
Mother-in-law 
Ineligible 237 139 
(%) 11.98 7.02 
Eligible 657 946 
(%) 33.20 47.80 
Note. The table shows eligibility according to age and contribution criteria and eligibility according to ager criterion only. Sample 
size is lower than 8402 since eligibility can only be computed for individuals who are alive and ever participated in the labor force. 
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Table 4 
Effect of Grandparent Availability on labor force participation of Women with Children under 15 
Dep.var.: Woman in the labor force (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mothers      
Alive and never worked 0.045* 0.047* 0.029 0.026 0.033 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
Alive and eligible 0.153*** 0.136*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.085* 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.044) 
Alive and ineligible 0.065* 0.057 0.032 0.026 0.014 
(0.039) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.051) 
Mothers-in-law      
Alive and never worked 0.032 0.031 0.019 0.016 0.041 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 
Alive and eligible 0.102*** 0.093*** 0.073** 0.073** -0.017 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.039) 
Alive and ineligible 0.098* 0.087* 0.078 0.072 0.001 
(0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) 
Fathers      
Alive and never worked 0.052 0.058 0.065 0.064 0.08 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.070) 
Alive and eligible 0.015 0.015 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Alive and ineligible -0.045* -0.014 -0.02 -0.021 -0.015 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Fathers-in-law      
Alive and never worked -0.156** -0.140** -0.133* -0.133* -0.111 
(0.070) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.076) 
Alive and eligible 0.019 0.021 -0.005 -0.009 -0.011 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
Alive and ineligible -0.031 -0.017 -0.035 -0.038 -0.026 
(0.027) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Grandparent’s age (linear and squared) and education No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Woman’s age (linear and squared) and education No No Yes Yes Yes 
Partner’s education and income No No No Yes Yes 
Grandparent’s employment sector and type No No No No Yes 
Municipality size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8402 8402 8402 8402 8402 
Mother alive eligible – Mother alive ineligible 0.088** 0.078** 0.081** 0.081** 0.071**
Labor force participation rate of women if mother alive ineligible 62.26% 62.26% 62.26% 62.26% 62.26%
Note: The sample includes women aged 20–49, who have at least one child under 15 living in the household. Standard errors in 
parenthesis are bootstrapped and clustered by household, observations are weighted, and the omitted category for availability status is 
being dead. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < .01. 
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Table 5 
Effect of Grandparental Availability on labor force participation by Gender and Child Age  
 Baseline No child<15 Men 0–10 0–5 
Dep.var.: Woman in the labor force (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mothers      
Alive and never worked 0.033 -0.003 -0.008 0.049 0.054 
(0.025) (0.034) (0.007) (0.031) (0.038) 
Alive and eligible 0.085* 0.01 -0.005 0.104** 0.203*** 
(0.044) (0.046) (0.008) (0.051) (0.069) 
Alive and ineligible 0.014 0.027 -0.011 0.039 0.055 
(0.051) (0.052) (0.010) (0.058) (0.072) 
Mothers-in-law      
Alive and never worked 0.041 -0.021 0.006 0.061* 0.069 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.008) (0.033) (0.043) 
Alive and eligible -0.017 0.023 0.001 -0.051 -0.067 
(0.039) (0.035) (0.011) (0.040) (0.057) 
Alive and ineligible 0.001 -0.033 0.004 -0.011 -0.022 
(0.053) (0.056) (0.012) (0.055) (0.065) 
Fathers      
Alive and never worked 0.08 -0.036 0.012 0.082 0.129 
(0.070) (0.075) (0.030) (0.078) (0.090) 
Alive and eligible -0.004 0.001 0.006 -0.022 -0.003 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.005) (0.023) (0.031) 
Alive and ineligible -0.015 -0.016 0.015** -0.029 -0.015 
(0.028) (0.039) (0.007) (0.030) (0.038) 
Fathers-in-law      
Alive and never worked -0.111 -0.257** -0.090* -0.127 -0.215** 
(0.076) (0.103) (0.049) (0.084) (0.106) 
Alive and eligible -0.011 0.025 -0.003 -0.004 0.017 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.005) (0.020) (0.027) 
Alive and ineligible -0.026 0.03 -0.008 -0.04 -0.051 
(0.030) (0.044) (0.007) (0.032) (0.039) 
Grandparent’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Woman’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Partner’s education and income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Grandparent’s employment sector and type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8402 5041 8402 6479 3803 
Mother alive eligible – Mother alive ineligible 0.071** -0.017 0.006 0.065*** 0.148*** 
Labor force participation rate of women if mother alive ineligible 62.26% 78.67% 62.26% 61.40% 58.06% 
Note: The sample includes women aged 20–49, who have at least one child under 15 living in the household. Standard errors in 
parenthesis are bootstrapped and clustered by household, observations are weighted, and the omitted category for availability status is 
being dead. Column (1) is the baseline model from Table 4, column (5); column (2) shows the baseline model replicated for the 
sample of women who have no children aged 0–14 living in the household; column (3) refers to the male partners of the women in 
column (1) (consistent with other models, Mothers and Fathers are maternal grandparents, while in-law’s are paternal grandparents); 
columns (4) and (5) include only the subsamples of women who have children aged 0–10, and 0–5, respectively. Column (6) includes 
monetary transfers and home ownership among controls. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < .01. 
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Table 6 
Effect of Grandparental Availability on the labor force participation of Women with Children under 15 
including controls for Monetary and Wealth Transfers 
 
 Baseline    
Dep.var.: Woman in the labor force (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mothers     
Alive and never worked 0.033 0.029 0.034 0.033 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Alive and eligible 0.085* 0.085* 0.086** 0.085* 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) 
Alive and ineligible 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.014 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) 
Mothers-in-law     
Alive and never worked 0.041 0.038 0.039 0.041 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
Alive and eligible -0.017 -0.021 -0.017 -0.018 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Alive and ineligible 0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.001 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Fathers     
Alive and never worked 0.080 0.083 0.079 0.081 
(0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) 
Alive and eligible -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Alive and ineligible -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Fathers-in-law     
Alive and never worked -0.111 -0.114 -0.107 -0.111 
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) 
Alive and eligible -0.011 -0.014 -0.012 -0.011 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Alive and ineligible -0.026 -0.025 -0.027 -0.026 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Grandparent’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Woman’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Partner’s education and income Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Grandparent’s employment sector and type Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality size Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Monetary transfers     No Yes Yes Yes 
Rented vs. owned house No Yes No No 
Inherited house No No No Yes 
Inherited, donated , “free use” house No No Yes No 
Observations 8402 8402 8392 8402 
Mother alive eligible – Mother alive ineligible 0.071** 0.071** 0.072** 0.072** 
LFP women if mother alive ineligible 62.26% 62.26% 62.26% 62.26% 
Note: The sample includes women aged 20–49, who have at least one child under 15 living in the household. Standard errors in 
parenthesis are bootstrapped and clustered by household, observations are weighted, and the omitted category for availability status is 
being dead. Column (1) is the baseline model from Table 4, column (5); column (2) shows the baseline model replicated for the 
sample of women who have no children aged 0–14 living in the household; column (3) refers to the male partners of the women in 
column (1) (consistent with other models, Mothers and Fathers are maternal grandparents, while in-law’s are paternal grandparents); 
columns (4) and (5) include only the subsamples of women who have children aged 0–10, and 0–5, respectively. Column (6) includes 
monetary transfers and home ownership among controls. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < .01. 
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Table 7 
Effect of Grandparental Availability on the labor force participation of Women with Children under 15 by 
Educational Level and Municipal Size 
 Baseline Education Municipality size
Dep.var.: Woman in the labor force (1) (2) (4) 
Mothers    
Alive and never worked 0.033   
(0.025)   
Alive and eligible 0.085*   
(0.044)   
Alive and ineligible 0.014   
(0.051)   
By educational level 
Alive and eligible: Less educated women  0.114**  
  (0.049)  
Alive and eligible: Highly educated women  0.052  
  (0.047)  
Alive and ineligible: Less educated women  0.016  
  (0.059)  
Alive and ineligible: Highly educated women  0.002  
  (0.058)  
By size of municipality of residence 
Alive and eligible: Small municipalities   0.112** 
   (0.049) 
Alive and eligible: Large municipalities   0.057 
   (0.046) 
Alive and ineligible: Small municipalities   0 
   (0.066) 
Alive and ineligible: Large municipalities   0.032 
   (0.052) 
Mothers-in-law Yes Yes Yes 
Fathers Yes Yes Yes 
Fathers-in-law Yes Yes Yes 
Grandparent’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes Yes 
Woman’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes Yes 
Partner’s education and income Yes Yes Yes 
Grandparent’s employment sector and type Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality size Yes Yes Yes 
Region × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8402 8402 8402 
Mother alive eligible – Mother alive ineligible 0.071**   
Mother alive eligible – Mother alive ineligible (low education)  0.097*  
Mother alive eligible – Mother alive ineligible (high education)  0.051  
Mother alive eligible – Mother alive ineligible (small municipality)   0.112** 
Mother alive eligible – Mother alive ineligible (large municipality)   0.025 
Labor force participation rate of women if mother alive ineligible 62.26% 62.26% 62.26% 
Note: The sample includes women aged 20–49, who have at least one child under 15 living in the household. Standard errors in 
parenthesis are bootstrapped and clustered by household, observations are weighted, and the omitted category for availability status is 
being dead. Column (1) is the baseline model from Table 4, column (5); column (2) shows the grandparental availability of those 
who have ever worked interacted with the woman’s education ( “highly educated” = upper secondary or more; “less educated” = 
lower secondary or less); column (3) shows the grandparental availability of those who have ever worked interacted with the size of 
the woman’s municipality of residence (“small” = 20,000 residents or less; “large” = over 20,000). Even though we computed all the 
coefficients for the woman’s father and in-laws, these are not reported in the table. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < 
.01. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
A. Regression for Predicted Years of Contribution 
 
Dep.var.: Actual years of contribution (1) 
Male 5.210*** 
0.062 
Age 0.627*** 
0.003 
Education: None ref 
 . 
Education: Primary 5.959*** 
0.149 
Education: Lower secondary 8.373*** 
0.157 
Education: Upper secondary and vocational 7.709*** 
0.160 
Education: Tertiary 5.535*** 
0.181 
Education: Post-tertiary 4.061*** 
0.684 
Sector: Agriculture ref 
. 
Sector: Industry -0.817*** 
0.193 
Sector: Public 0.695*** 
0.199 
Sector: Others -1.627*** 
0.193 
Sector: Not in the labor force -4.590*** 
0.192 
Regions Yes 
Years Yes 
Observations 74866 
Note: The sample includes all individuals. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < .01 
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B. Robustness Checks and Further Evidence 
Employment. In Table B1, we report the same models estimated in Table 4 but using as our 
dependent variable a dichotomous indicator equal to 1 if a woman is employed or and 0 otherwise. 
Results are very close to those using LFP: in the saturated model (column (5) of Table B1), among 
the eight grandparent eligibility variables, only the coefficient on maternal grandmother eligibility 
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Women with pension eligible mothers have an 8.5 
and 7.7 percentage point higher employment probability, respectively, than women whose mothers 
are dead or pension ineligible. The corresponding effects on LFP are 8.5 percentage points and 7.1 
percentage points, respectively (column (5) of Table 4). The fact that the LFP and employment 
results are practically indistinguishable strongly suggests the pension eligibility status of maternal 
grandmothers does indeed capture the effect of their child care provision. In fact, we expect no 
significant effect on unemployed mothers, who can personally take care of their children. 
Intensive margins. The availability of informal child care may affect not only LFP (or 
employment) probability but also the intensive margin of labor supply; that is, the number of hours 
worked, or even women’s productivity, reflected in wages and earnings. Grandparents may, for 
instance, take care of children when they are ill, reducing the number of maternal absences from 
work in the short run and possibly even improving the latter’s career prospects in the long run. To 
gain an approximate idea of the grandparent availability effect on weekly working hours, hourly 
wages, and annual earnings, we use the saturated model to estimate logarithmic regressions on the 
sample of working mothers. The estimated effects of maternal grandmother availability are 0.022, 
0.045, and 0.075 on hours, wages, and earnings, respectively, none of which are statistically 
significant at conventional levels.26 Thus, overall, there is no compelling evidence that grandmother 
availability for child care affects the intensive margin of labor supply or productivity. Grandmothers 
                                                            
26 Because of space constraints, we do not report these estimates here. They are, however, available upon request from 
the authors. 
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simply seem to help working women to overcome their first important obstacle after having 
children – remaining attached to the labor force. 
Alternative definitions of pension eligibility. We have stated earlier in this paper that 
considering seniority-based pension rules in addition to age-based pension rules increases the 
precision of our measure of grandparental eligibility and potential availability for child care. To 
support this claim, here we redefine eligibility based purely on age and then re-estimate the 
saturated model. The results, reported in column (2) of Table B2, are qualitatively similar to (albeit 
less precisely estimated than) our baseline findings (column (1)): a 0.043 difference in LFP between 
women with and without eligible mothers, which is in line with that reported in the reduced form 
estimates of AFVF (2015). This difference is, however, not statistically significant at conventional 
levels, presumably because of the noisier imputation of eligibility status, which does not consider 
the requirements for seniority pensions.  
Finally, in column (2) of Table B2, we follow Aparicio-Fenoll and Vidal-Fernandez (2015) by 
imputing eligibility only on age and omitting controls for grandparental education and employment 
sector and type. Although the coefficient on grandparental eligibility increases and is significant at 
5%, the contrast between pension eligible and nonpension eligible maternal grandmothers further 
reduces in size (0.037) and loses statistical significance. This outcome again underscores the 
importance of exploiting seniority pension rules in defining retirement eligibility. 
Sample selection issues. The final concern that we address is related to our initial sample 
selection. Because we focus on the effect of grandparental child care availability on maternal labor 
force participation, our analysis is conditional on women having children aged 0–14 living in the 
household. Yet this condition begs the question of whether this population of interest actually 
constitutes a random sample of women with respect to unobservable characteristics that potentially 
affect labor market behavior. For example, if we were also to include childless women entering 
motherhood, would the effect of grandparental eligibility be larger or smaller than that reported? To 
provide a tentative answer, we estimate a Heckman selection model using the main equation for 
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LFP and a selection equation for the presence of children aged 0–14 in the household. Although the 
model is formally identified even without an exclusion restriction (Puhani 2000), we propose an 
economic identification that uses as “instrument” a proxy for the woman’s spouse being an only 
child; that is, the number (from the SHIW) of noncohabiting siblings still alive for each individual 
in a couple. This number is likely to be a good proxy for only-child status because mortality is still 
low in the age groups considered and sibling cohabitation after forming families and having 
children is very rare.  
The underlying rationale for using this instrument is that being raised as an only child may 
affect each spouse’s fertility preferences, which are likely to shape the couple’s actual fertility. We 
assume that conditional on the large set of observables included in our models (such as women’s, 
grandparents’, and partners’ characteristics, including the latter’s level of education and income), 
the spouse’s only-child status is exogenous with respect to the woman’s labor market attachment. 
We consider only the spousal status because previous studies show that maternal grandparents are 
the most likely to provide child care, so the women’s only-child status may violate the exclusion 
restriction assumption if siblings create higher competition for the maternal grandmother’s child 
care. We also expect this focus to break any potential link between a woman’s fertility, her mother’s 
fertility, and the woman’s labor market preferences, which may be correlated across generations 
because of unobservable attributes.27 
Table B3 reports the results of the Heckman selection model. Column (1) shows the 
coefficients of the selection equation, and column (2) those of the main equation. The spouse’s 
only-child status significantly predicts the presence of young children in the household: only-child 
men are 4.7 (p-value = 0.028) percentage points less likely to have cohabiting young children. 
Interestingly, women with eligible mothers have a 3.5. percentage points higher probability of 
                                                            
27 The estimates in this section must be nonetheless interpreted with caution because some residual endogeneity may 
remain if the spouse’s only-child status is affected by unobservable variables that also determine her partner’s LFP. To 
the best of our knowledge, the existing literature focuses mainly on mother-son or mother-daughter intergenerational 
fertility correlations (e.g., Kolk 2014, Cools and Kaldager Hart 2016) while much less is known about the relation 
between a woman’s fertility choices and her partner’s family size. 
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having young cohabiting children than those with ineligible mothers, a finding consistent with the 
effect reported by Battistin et al. (2015) on fertility, although in our case, the estimate is not 
statistically significant.28 The coefficient on the inverse Mill’s ratio is positive, but conditioning on 
a large set of controls is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Column (2) also shows 
that eligible grandmothers increase LFP by an estimated 7.9 percentage points with respect to 
noneligible grandmothers. This effect is practically the same as that estimated in the model that 
does not account for selection. Although we do not consider this evidence as definitive proof of the 
absence of a sample selection bias, which would allow us to generalize our estimated effects to 
childless women if they were mothers, it is nonetheless indicative that the bias, if any, is unlikely to 
be severe. 
  
                                                            
28 This outcome may be due to the different dependent variables used in the two studies. For our study, the relevant 
selection is on the presence of young children in the household (see also Battistin et al., 2015, for a comprehensive 
analysis of the effect of grandparental pension eligibility on fertility). All effects for the selection equation are 
computed as average marginal effects.  
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Table B1 
Effect of Grandparental Availability on the employment of Women with Children under 15 
Dep.var.: Woman employment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mothers      
Alive and never worked 0.038 0.04 0.022 0.019 0.026 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) 
Alive and eligible 0.151*** 0.131*** 0.109*** 0.103*** 0.085* 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.044) 
Alive and ineligible 0.053 0.047 0.022 0.015 0.007 
(0.038) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.049) 
Mothers-in-law      
Alive and never worked 0.036 0.037 0.025 0.022 0.041 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) 
Alive and eligible 0.096*** 0.086*** 0.065** 0.065** -0.003 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.040) 
Alive and ineligible 0.080* 0.083* 0.073 0.067 0.016 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.052) 
Fathers      
Alive and never worked 0.035 0.045 0.053 0.052 0.074 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.071) 
Alive and eligible 0.015 0.017 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Alive and ineligible -0.038 0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) 
Fathers-in-law      
Alive and never worked -0.132* -0.103 -0.097 -0.098 -0.07 
(0.072) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.077) 
Alive and eligible 0.023 0.027 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Alive and ineligible -0.029 -0.001 -0.02 -0.024 -0.01 
(0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Grandparent’s age (linear and squared) and education No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Woman’s age (linear and squared) and education No No Yes Yes Yes 
Partner’s education and income No No No Yes Yes 
Grandparent’s employment sector and type  No No No No Yes 
Municipality size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8402 8402 8402 8402 8402 
Mother alive eligible – Mother alive ineligible 0.098*** 0.084** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.077** 
Employment rate of women if mother alive ineligible 59.25% 59.25% 59.25% 59.25% 59.25% 
Note: The sample includes women aged 20–49, who have at least one child under 15 living in the household. Standard errors in 
parenthesis are bootstrapped and clustered by household, observations are weighted, and the omitted category for availability status is 
being dead. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < .01. 
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Table B2 
Effect of grandparental availability on the labor force participation of Women with Children under 15 under 
Different Imputations of Retirement Eligibility 
 Basis for eligibility 
 
Our 
definition Age only Age only 
Dep.var.: Woman in the labor force (1) (2) (3) 
Mothers    
Alive and never worked 0.033 0.035 0.025 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Alive and eligible 0.085* 0.065 0.094*** 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.029) 
Alive and ineligible 0.014 0.022 0.057 
(0.051) (0.057) (0.046) 
Mothers-in-law    
Alive and never worked 0.041 0.041 0.020 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) 
Alive and eligible -0.017 -0.023 0.062** 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.029) 
Alive and ineligible 0.001 0.094 0.186*** 
(0.053) (0.068) (0.065) 
Fathers    
Alive and never worked 0.08 0.088 0.069 
(0.070) (0.070) (0.062) 
Alive and eligible -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Alive and ineligible -0.015 -0.037 -0.031 
(0.028) (0.035) (0.036) 
Fathers-in-law    
Alive and never worked -0.111 -0.103 -0.131* 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.068) 
Alive and eligible -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Alive and ineligible -0.026 -0.053 -0.062 
(0.030) (0.052) (0.054) 
Grandparent’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes Only age 
Woman’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes Yes 
Partner’s education and income Yes Yes Yes 
Grandparent’s employment sector and type Yes Yes No 
Municipality size Yes Yes Yes 
Region × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8402 8402 8402 
Mother alive eligible – Mother alive ineligible 0.071** 0.043 0.037 
Labor force participation rate of women if mother 
alive ineligible 62.26% 58.76% 58.76% 
Note: The sample includes women aged 20–49, who have at least one child under 15 living in the household. Standard errors in 
parenthesis are bootstrapped only in column (1) and clustered by household, observations are weighted, and the omitted category for 
availability status is being dead. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < .05, *** p-value < .01. 
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Table B3 
Effect of grandparental availability on the labor force participation of Women with Children under 15 – 
Heckman selection model 
Dep.var.:  Child 0-14 (selection) LFP 
(1) (2) 
Mothers 
Alive and never worked 0.049 0.034 
(0.075) (0.029) 
Alive and eligible 0.150 0.094** 
(0.130) (0.05) 
Alive and ineligible 0.031 0.015 
  (0.126) (0.053) 
Mothers-in-law   
Alive and never worked 0.027 0.045 
(0.067) (0.030) 
Alive and eligible 0.000 -0.017 
(0.103) (0.043) 
Alive and ineligible 0.043 0.006 
  (0.135) (0.054) 
Fathers   
Alive and never worked 0.085 0.094 
(0.288) (0.071) 
Alive and eligible 0.020 -0.005 
(0.052) (0.030) 
Alive and ineligible -0.026 -0.012 
  (0.097) (0.029) 
Fathers-in-law   
Alive and never worked 0.146 -0.132* 
(0.269) (0.072) 
Alive and eligible 0.094 -0.007 
(0.054) (0.027) 
Alive and ineligible -0.041 -0.031 
(0.100) (0.031) 
  
N. of spouse's noncohabiting siblings alive 0.157** - 
(0.078)  
  
Inverse Mill's Ratio - 0.123 
   (0.338) 
Grandparent’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes 
Woman’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes 
Partner’s education and income Yes Yes 
Grandparent’s employment sector and type Yes Yes 
Municipality size Yes Yes 
Region × year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 13441 8402 
Mother alive eligible – Mother alive ineligible 0.035 0.079** 
Labor force participation rate of women if mother alive 
ineligible 62.49% 59.25% 
Note: The sample includes women aged 20–49, who have at least one child under 15 living in the household. Standard errors in 
parenthesis are bootstrapped only in column (1) and clustered by household, observations are weighted, and the omitted category for 
availability status is being dead. Column (1) reports the coefficients of the probit selection equation. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < .05, 
*** p-value < .01. 
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C. Predicted labor force participation Rates under Different Scenarios 
Full sample (a) With children aged 0–5 (b) 
With grandmothers who have ever been in 
labor force (c) 
Year Pre-Amato Dini Difference Pre-Amato Dini Difference Pre-Amato Dini Difference 
1993 0.5024 0.4944 0.0080 0.4880 0.4627 0.0253 0.6102 0.5854 0.0248 
1995 0.5249 0.5164 0.0085 0.5291 0.5020 0.0271 0.6369 0.6097 0.0272 
1998 0.5230 0.5133 0.0097 0.5192 0.4900 0.0292 0.6950 0.6668 0.0282 
2000 0.5262 0.5177 0.0085 0.5294 0.5060 0.0234 0.6775 0.6491 0.0284 
2002 0.5261 0.5178 0.0084 0.5066 0.4799 0.0267 0.6719 0.6451 0.0268 
2004 0.5654 0.5572 0.0082 0.5588 0.5336 0.0252 0.7067 0.6815 0.0252 
2006 0.6059 0.5978 0.0081 0.6261 0.5986 0.0275 0.7435 0.7202 0.0233 
Note: The Table reports the labor force participation rates of different samples of women computed under different set of rules on 
pension eligibility for their mothers. The Pre-Amato scenario is based on the assumption that in all years the eligibility rules are those 
that were in place until 1992 (i.e. before the Amato reform). The Dini scenario is based on the assumption that in all years the more 
restrictive rules set by the 1995 Dini reform apply to everyone. The column “Difference” shows the difference between the two 
scenarios. The three samples considered consist of all women with children aged 0-14 (a), all women with children aged 0-5 (b), and 
all women with children aged 0-14, whose mothers participated in the labor force (c). These labor force participation probabilities are 
plotted in Figure 3. 
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